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ABSTRACT: 
This research piece investigates how Zimbabwe’s government was successful in 
rendering a regional court obsolete, with the implicit approval of South Africa. It also tackles 
how South Africa’s judiciary stepped in to fill the resulting jurisdictional void by enforcing a 
distinctively detrimental decision on Robert Mugabe’s regime on a particularly controversial 
subject for both countries: namely, land restitution. In achieving the above, South Africa’s 
judicial branch managed to repair some of its executive’s missteps in handling Zimbabwe’s 
descent to authoritarianism – one brimming with human rights infringements and attacks on 
the rule of law. The article lies at the intersection of two humanities: political science and 
law, drawing themes and research methods from each. Still, it is not limited to practitioners 
from the said fields, being specifically constructed to be accessible to any interested reader.  
KEYWORDS: democracy; the rule of law; authoritarianism; national jurisdiction; 
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ZIMBABWE’S DEMOCRACY BESIEGED 
During the Lancaster House Conference of 1979, Zimbabwe’s regime conceded 
defeat, and the country once again became a colony of Britain, thereby receiving a new 
constitution. Ian Smith’s defeat also put an end to the internal war between Zimbabwe’s 
liberation movements
1
 and the minority government. Shortly thereafter, the British ended a 
period of 14 years of sanctions, and most of Zimbabwe’s neighbours followed suit, alongside 
the UN. Zimbabwe emerged as an independent state on 18 April 1980, with Robert Mugabe 
as its Prime Minister and head of government and Canaan Banana as its ceremonial President, 
after ZANU’s landslide victory in elections. In the decades to follow, Mugabe established 
himself as the de facto ruler of Zimbabwe by gradually seizing the country’s power structures. 
Dissent was silenced through either coercion or co-optation for almost three decades. ZANU-
PF’s elites eventually ousted Robert Mugabe from power in 2017, after an intraparty fight for 
power. 
In the late 1990s, Zimbabwe’s political system was marked by a classical form of 
authoritarianism. Political power was centralised around the figure of President Mugabe and 
his clientele – mainly composed of ruling party members and supporters. This client-patron 
relationship is what enabled ruptures in the democratic process. The holders of political power 
relied on nationalism when promoting a culture of intolerance towards the other part of 
society, which encapsulated political parties, civil society organisations, labour unions, and 
professionals from all spheres of work, including the judiciary. On the other hand, the 
divergent part of the population articulated narratives of ‘transition’, amid hopes that ZANU-
PF would cede power and that a new regime would strive for further democratisation. The 
establishment grew tired of this latter category not falling in line with its modus operandi; 
                                                          
1 The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) 
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thus, it started considering them enemies of the state – as the former took upon themselves to 
be the only legitimate representatives of the state. 
Briefly, the independent judiciary was bullied into submission; the remaining cluster 
of the free press was manipulated into demonising the political opposition, and civil society 
was either drawn in by threats or incentivised to give up their advocacy role. 
Due to government overspending, generalised corruption, and gross mismanagement, 
Zimbabwe faced one of the most catastrophic financial crises of modernity, which gave birth 
to popular dissatisfaction. As a result, Mugabe’s government pushed back – in an attempt to 
cling to power and shrug off disapproval. Still, Mugabe was left unconstrained from other 
state powers.  
Zimbabwe’s (mostly) liberal Constitution was applied discretionarily, and one could 
not speak of a truly independent judiciary. This fertile ground allowed authoritarianism to 
foster and enabled President Mugabe to act as the supreme authority in law – sometimes the 
only such authority. Capitalising on his position, he often ignored court rulings, which the 
executive chose not to enforce
2
 because, as Mugabe phrased it, Zimbabwe’s administration 
“respect[ed] judgments where the judgments [were] true judgments”
3
. One can argue that the 
government sometimes acted as a control power - a sort of supra-judiciary, if you may: court 
decisions were measured, weighed, and those found wanting were dismissed. In numerous 
instances, dissenting judges were forced to resign,
4
 while other judges retired in good health, 
without any declared reasons, only to have their posts filled by Mugabe loyalists.
5
 White 
judges gradually left the judiciary amid pressures, as they were “maligned because of their 
race and alleged links to the colonial era”.
 6
 One of the most pertinent examples of exclusion 
based on race is former Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay, who was forced to resign in 2001 
after months of vilification. In theory, Zimbabwe’s legislation provides checks and balances 
in the way the executive and legislative exercise their respective powers. However, in the 
period perused by our research, this system’s effectiveness fell tributary to numerous 
controversies.  
DE JURE AND DE FACTO – ON FORMS WITHOUT SUBSTANCE 
In 2013, Zimbabwe introduced a new Constitution, after several counter-democratic 
amendments had made their way in the body of text in previous years. Relating to the 
independence of the judiciary, Section 164 of the said Constitution states that courts are 
independent and are subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply 
impartially, and that no actor, regardless if they are a part of the state apparatus or an 
individual, may interfere to breach independence, which is crucial to the rule of law and, 
subsequently, to democratic governance.
7
 The state is required to both assist and provide 
protection to the courts, not only through legislative means, which would “ensure their 
independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness”.
8
 Nevertheless, courts’ 
                                                          
2 For a list of court decisions which had been ignored by 2003 see the footnote section of Arnold Tsunga, “The Legal 
Profession and the Judiciary as Human Rights Defenders in Zimbabwe in 2003. Separation or Consolidation of Powers on the 
part of the State?”, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), p. 2, Available at: 
http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/hr/zlhr_legal_judic_hrdef_031224.pdf. 
3 Robert Mugabe quoted in Tsunga, ibid. 
4 James R. Arnold and Roberta Weiner, Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe (Revised Edition), Minneapolis: Lerner Publishing, 
2008, p. 84. 
5 Peta Thornycroft, “Zimbabwe High Court judge quits”, The Telegraph, 04 January 2002, Available at: 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/1380399/Zimbabwe-High-Court-judge-quits.html. 
6 Ibid. 
7Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013, 22 May 2013, Section 164, Available at: www.refworld.org/docid/51ed090f4.html. 
8 Ibid., Section 165.3. 
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impartiality and independence had been stipulated, albeit in simplified terms, in Zimbabwe’s 
1980 constitution and reinforced by a series of amendments, including one in 1990.9
 
Furthermore, Zimbabwe’s new Constitution stipulates that the courts’ decisions are 
binding on everyone, including the institutions and agencies of the state.
10
 All the provisions 
above draw their inspiration from the 1996 Constitution of South Africa
11
 and seek to cover 
the double-sided essence of judicial independence: institutional independence and the 
independence of decision-making. Even by afar, the text of the two constitutions, especially 
regarding judicial independence, is similar to such a degree that Zimbabwe’s legislative 
power seems to have only rephrased what had been laid down by its South African 
counterpart. Taking the principles that function in South Africa and including them in the 
Zimbabwe’s Constitution demonstrates an act of goodwill while also revealing a tangible way 
in which South Africa has impacted the legislative process of its neighbour. Nonetheless, we 
argue that similar to the case of the Lancaster Constitution, drawing inspiration from the form 
of a decree does not suffice, for certain values have to be embedded inside the branches of 
power, thereby providing a guarantee that the essence behind drafted legislation is known and 
understood, and can be applied. As for the presence of these ‘guardian values’, Mugabe’s 
government’s actions since the 1990s prompt one to show restraint and scepticism - to put it 
mildly.  
If we were to extend the comparison between the constitutions of South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, we must note that the distinct ways in which the political settlements came to 
fruition. In South Africa, transition materialised organically - it was negotiated between 
stakeholders; whereas, in Zimbabwe’s case, the transition was super-imposed by external 
entities, such as the UN or UK. Van Zyl Slabbert warned in 1992 that the constitutional order 
in Zimbabwe had been imposed by external actors, leading to a perilous construction from the 
get-go.
12
 With no organic, internally negotiated settlement – such as in South Africa - the 
super-imposed Constitution, while not lacking in democratic principles, suffered from the 
absence of a sound source for those principles. Zimbabwe’s independence came in the 
circumstances of a forceful marriage between a profoundly racist authoritarian regime and a 
Marxist liberation movement, namely ZANU. A long-lasting democratic order could hardly 
emerge from such a combination because the essential foundations needed were missing. 
Furthermore, ZANU was contested by its rival, ZAPU, and needed to identify ways to assert 
its supremacy within national politics: thereby, the construction of a healthy democratic order 
was not necessarily the main priority for the latter. 
There are numerous historical ties between South Africa and Zimbabwe, as their 
colonial past made the two states fall victim to many of the same plagues. As such, the two 
countries sometimes have similar objectives. Restituting land to those dispossessed by the 
former regimes is par excellence, one of them. While in the past, the methods used by the two 
for pursuing said objectives demonstrated striking differences, the distinctions seem to have 
all but faded as of recent. South Africa’s constant tacit approval of Mugabe’s human rights 
infringements related to land restitution has attracted the government in Pretoria a sum of 
critiques from the West. Western leaders envisaged the regional hegemon as its own foothold 
in Africa. While that still rings true on many issues, when it comes to the historical retribution 
for the past minority governments’ sins, one can understand South Africa’s tendency to side 
with those with shared similar experiences. 
ON LAND RESTITUTION AND FARM SEIZURES 
                                                          
9 Constitution of Zimbabwe 1980,  18 April 1980, Ch. 8, Section. 79b, Available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5720.html  
10 Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013, op. cit., Section 164. 
11 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 10 December 1996, Section 165, Available at: 
www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5de4.html. 
12 See Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in Transition, London: Penguin, 1992. 
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The land seizures that took place under the colonial regimes of the past represent one 
of Zimbabwe’s major unhealed wounds. Through a series of racist laws, land was confiscated 
from the majority population, who were sometimes resettled, and awarded to large scale white 
farmers. As such, historical retribution remains latched in Zimbabwe to the question of land. 
However, while returning land to the dispossessed black citizens of Zimbabwe has always 
been a prerogative, Zimbabwe’s 1980 constitution has a generous part dedicated to the 
protection of property
13
, in which forceful seizure was restricted but not forbidden. 
Amendments to the Constitution – most notably Act 30 of 1990,
14
 further detailed the 
circumstances in which land could be acquired by mandatory compensation – and the 
jurisdiction to decide on possible litigations.  In 1992, the Land Acquisition Act was passed, 
thereby extending the government’s capacity to acquire land through compulsory action. Even 
with the said legislation in place, the land reform went slowly, and no decisive government 
action was taken in this regard until the end of the 1990s.
15
 In 2000, the majority of 
Zimbabweans, rallied by the opposing party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 
voted against the new Constitution proposed by Mugabe’s regime. This fact sparked a violent 
outbreak orchestrated by ZANU-PF, which led to a series of occupations of white-owned 
farms. The administration called the seizures led by so-called war veterans’ spontaneous’ and 
did not admit to any involvement. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that the government was 
behind the entire affair, in a desperate attempt to flex their muscles so that they might deter 
the opposition from consolidating their standing within national politics. As the 
overwhelming part of literature in the field uses the syntagm ‘war veterans’ when referring to 
the squatters taking over farms, we have also adopted it. Still, some critics argue that only a 
small percentage of the squatters were veterans, the rest being too young to have fought in the 
independence war 20 years earlier.
16
 In truth, up to 85% of the said veterans were unemployed 
youths paid by the ruling party.  
THE SADC TRIBUNAL’S DEMISE 
While the South African Development Community (SADC) was either limited or 
outright powerless in enforcing decisions about Zimbabwe, there had been binding treaties 
that made several institutions of the SADC, such as the SADC Tribunal, capable of resolving 
disputes and tackling the issues in the said state. The SADC Tribunal had been created back 
in 1992, but due to a series of delays and incidents,
17
 it only appointed judges in 2005 and 
started hearing cases two years later.  
A decision was reached in one of the Tribunal’s first human rights cases, in November 
2008. In Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe, the plaintiffs argued 
that the land redistribution put in practice by the government against whites was illegal.
18
 In 
2007, the Tribunal had issued an interim ruling affirming its jurisdiction, granted that the 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe had previously denied the plaintiffs the right to object to their 
land’s seizure. Thus, the plaintiffs had been left without any potential domestic legal remedy. 
The SADC Tribunal ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, thereby reinforcing these specific 
farmers’ right to lock the government’s acquisition of their farms. The Tribunal also argued 
that farm evictions under Amendment 17 of Zimbabwe’s Constitution
19
 represented a de facto 
                                                          
13 Constitution of Zimbabwe 1980, op. cit., Ch. 3, Para. Section 16.  
14 Also Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 14) Act, 1996 
15 Beverly L. Peters and Naudé Malan, “Caveats for land reform in South Africa: Lessons from Zimbabwe”, in South African 
Journal of International Affairs, 7 (2), 2000, p. 154. 
16 Linda van Buren, “Economy”, in Katherine Murison (ed.), Africa South of the Sahara, London: Europa Publications 2004, 
p. 1232. 
17 On 18 January 2007, the Turnhalle building in Windhoek, which accommodated the court room burned down and was 
completely destroyed, with reconstruction starting in the fall, the same year. 
18 See “Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) [2008]”, SADC Tribunal 2, 28 November 
2008. 
19 Amendment 17 removes Zimbabwean courts’ jurisdiction to hear an any plea that contests expropriations conducted by 
government. 
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discrimination of the country’s white population,
20
 and violated the SADC Treaty principles 
on non-discrimination and the rule of law
21
. 
Mugabe’s government, however, refused to recognise the Tribunal’s decision and 
vehemently opposed enforcing it. Zimbabwe pulled out of the SADC Tribunal in protest, as it 
had previously done from the Commonwealth of Nations.22 These unilateral actions show a 
recurrent modus operandi of  Mugabe, which, similarly to a child who clashes with others on 
the playground and can’t bully the latter, picks up his toys and leaves whenever deemed 
suitable. Whereas in the Commonwealth, Harare’s actions left Western powers unimpressed, 
inside the SADC, Mugabe’s peers did their best to avoid taking action against Zimbabwe and 
accommodate at least part of its wishes. Arguably, inside African fora, Mugabe reputation and 
his statute of elder, made him untouchable. The denigration campaign against the Tribunal 
launched bu Zimbabwe furthered “a stance amounting to non-compliance (with) enforceable 
rulings on human rights violations”,
23
 bringing about a “rule of power”
24
 that replaced the 
rule of law. During a 2010 Summit in Windhoek, the SADC ordered a review of the 
Tribunal’s functions, role, and terms of reference.
25
 South Africa stood silent on the issue, 
despite being legitimately expected to oppose such a move and pull the Tribunal forward, 
rather than accept pushing it back in time and rendering it invalid. Given its progressive 
Constitution and the constant trumpeted devotion to both human rights and the rule of law, 
this move can only be understood by analysing the regional political environment of that time 
through the lens of Pretoria’s aspirations. We will not go in detail but contend with saying 
that South Africa’s Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma26 needed Mugabe’s support to win AU 
Chairmanship – after she had failed to secure a first-ballot win.
27
 Thus, upsetting Zimbabwe’s 
President could have entailed sacrificing more significant foreign policy objectives for South 
Africa. 
Coming back from our excursus, we note that in the lack of other options, the farmers 
addressed their case to the South African court system. South Africa’s courts ruled that the 
defunct Tribunal’s verdict could be applied locally, granted that their country was a member 
of SADC and that regulations permitted such a move. The separation of powers in South 
Africa was still standing, despite its executive’s past predilections to side with Mugabe. As 
such, Zimbabwean farmers had every reason to believe that South African judges would 
remain impartial when hearing their case. There was also a belief that Jacob Zuma, South 
Africa’s new President, would be different from his predecessor and have a tougher stance on 
Zimbabwe.  
Zimbabwe took the case through the Supreme Court, to the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa. In a landmark judgement from 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled that 
dispossessed farmers could sue in South African courts for compensation and attack 
Zimbabwe’s assets in South Africa for compensation. The above constitutes the first ruling in 
international legal history, whereby a country’s assets could be sold within another country, in 
                                                          
20 Mike Campbell vs Republic of Zimbabwe, op. cit. 
21 Ibid. 
22 See Dan Petrica, “South Africa’s involvement in the issue of Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth of 
Nations”, in Comentario Internacional. Journal of the Andean Andean Center of International Studies, 20, 2020. 
23 Andre Dumon, “The SADC Tribunal: The rule of power versus the rule of law - The Tribunal Tragedy “, Helen Suzman 
Foundation, 14 March 2013, Available at: hsf.org.za/resource-centre/hsf-briefs/the-sadc-tribunal-the-rule-of-power-versus-
the-rule-of-law-the-tribunal-tragedy. 
24 Ibid. 
25 “Communique of the 30th Jubilee Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government", SADC, Republic of Namibia, 17 
August 2010. 
26 Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the former wife of South African President Jacob Zuma,  was amongst the leaders of the 
country’s ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC). She served at the time as South Africa’s Minister of Home 
Affairs.  
27 “AU chooses Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as leader”, BBC News, 15 July 2012, Available at: www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-18846210. 
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settlement for human rights violations.
28
 The Constitutional Court held that South Africa had 
obligations under a treaty, as a SADC member, to enforce the SADC Tribunal’s decision 
against Zimbabwe in South African domestic courts.
29
 This interpretation arose by developing 
the common-law doctrine of enforcement of foreign judgments to cover those pronounced by 
the SADC Tribunal. Despite contestation, the Court also held that no immunity could be 
granted to Zimbabwe in this specific case.
30
  
The government in Harare felt the shockwave emanating from this ruling. But the 
decision also had entailed salient political implications for South Africa, where the land 
reform was not going as fast as planned, and voices calling for a Zimbabwe-like model began 
to multiply. We cannot stress the importance of this landmark case. It shows that the South 
African judiciary can resist the pressures that have made the SADC Tribunal crumble and 
capable of objectively judging human rights cases, which Zimbabwean Courts had refused to 
touch due to their sensitive nature. The situation presented above provides us with one 
instance in which South Africa’s judicial branch demonstrates that it is free of the political 
constraints that keep the executive’s hands tied. It does not hear nor decide cases based on 
foreign policy goals.  
The decision reached by South Africa’s court system signified that that rule of law 
could no longer be taken arbitrarily by Mugabe’s government and that human rights, 
including that of property, must be sheltered. While Thabo Mbeki and, to some degree, Jacob 
Zuma needed to take into account several factors when dealing with Mugabe, such as the 
sometimes-unclear limits of (breaching) sovereignty, South Africa’s independent judiciary 
gave a lesson to both the executive of Zimbabwe and to its judiciary, which was more or less 
attached to ZANU-PF. The principle of separation of power inherent in South Africa 
demonstrates that while the executive dictates foreign policy and how international relations 
are created and kept, the judiciary can also set the parameters when called upon to solve 
exceptional situations. 
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
The SADC Tribunal took the issue of land distribution into its hands, and in a 
landmark decision of late-2008, decreed that the farm invasions occurring in Zimbabwe had 
been illegal. Mugabe’s regime met the decision with anger and refused to enforce it, only to 
pull Zimbabwe out from the Tribunal and successfully denigrate the institution. As a result, 
the Tribunal went under review and was later disbanded. South Africa’s implicitly approved 
both decisions, for it had foreign policy goals that needed Mugabe’s support. Furthermore, 
Pretoria pursued Zimbabwe’s objective to further land restitution on its own territory, albeit 
by different means. Finding themselves in the impossibility of obtaining domestic remedies, 
the said landmark case’s plaintiffs sought to transfer the judgement to South Africa’s courts, 
hoping for impartiality. The case reached the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which, 
decided that the plaintiffs could sue in South Africa and held that South Africa had 
obligations arousing from treaties to enforce the SADC Tribunal’s ruling against Zimbabwe. 
In South Africa, the judiciary was prompt to move from official governmental policy relating 
to its neighbour and prioritise human rights concerns and the sanctity of property rights. Thus, 
while not directly being a force of democratisation, South Africa’s judiciary punished anti-
democratic practices by compensating their victims through the sale of Zimbabwean assets. 
The issue presented in this article is very relevant today, especially since in December 
2018, South Africa’s Constitutional Court ruled that President Zuma’s participation in 
                                                          
28 See “Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others (CCT 101/12) [2013] ZACC 22; 2013 (5) SA 325 (CC); 
2013 (10) BCLR 1103 (CC) “, Constitutional Court of South Africa, 27 June 2013. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Immunity from civil jurisdiction and enforcement is usually accorded to foreign states by both international and South 
African domestic law. 
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abolishing the SADC Tribunal was unconstitutional. As such, South Africa withdrew its 
signature from the decision to disband the institution.  
The SADC Tribunal is still suspended; nevertheless, prompted by its Constitutional 
Court, South Africa seems to have found a new impetus to revive the body, or, at the 
minimum, resuscitate the stalemated talks surrounding it. 
This article’s key takeaway is that even in the absence of political will to tackle the 
various problems threatening democracy in a neighbouring one country, the judicial branch of 
power can repair some of the harm inflicted by the executive’s inaction or its 
counterproductive actions. 
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